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The Continuity of Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay
for Phil Frickey
Ernest A. Young†
This conference on the work of Philip Frickey as scholar, teacher, and
institutional citizen has been an education—a somewhat daunting one—in how
to achieve greatness as an academic. As a relatively junior person in this
company, I have little to contribute to that discussion. But what I can perhaps
document is Phil‘s intellectual influence on a rising generation of scholars in
American public law. Like the monks who preserved the classical heritage of
Greece and Rome, Phil and his coauthors, particularly Bill Eskridge, have
preserved the ―Legal Process‖ jurisprudence of 1950s giants like Henry Hart,
Albert Sacks, Herbert Wechsler, and Lon Fuller and transmitted it to
contemporary legal scholars. More than this, Phil‘s brilliant elaboration of that
jurisprudence in his own work has made the Legal Process approach
respectable in a more divided and critical age. As someone who values the
wisdom of tradition and believes the Legal Process thinkers still have much to
teach us,1 I consider these to be laudable contributions indeed.
This Essay seeks to honor Phil by exploring the contributions of his Legal
Process approach to a problem near and dear to his heart: the uses and
legitimacy of canons of statutory construction. I focus, as Phil did in his most

Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
† Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This Essay is part of a festschrift in honor
of Philip Frickey, and as such I intend it to express my profound gratitude for his scholarly
contributions and manifold personal kindnesses over the years. I will miss him, on both counts. I
am grateful to Dan Farber and the California Law Review for the opportunity to participate in this
conference, to Erin Blondel for comments on the manuscript, and to Greg Coleman, Guy Charles,
and Heather Gerken for helpful conversations on the Northwest Austin case.
1. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54
1143 (2005) (arguing for a Legal Process approach to conflicts between domestic and
supranational courts) [hereinafter Young, Institutional Settlement]; Ernest A. Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory & Constitutional Interpretation, 72
619 (1994) (emphasizing the importance of tradition in constitutional theory).
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recent work, on the canon of constitutional avoidance2—that is, the rule that
courts should construe statutes to avoid significant ―doubt‖ as to their
constitutionality.3 That canon figured prominently in one of the most
anticipated cases of the 2008 Supreme Court Term, in which the Justices turned
aside a major challenge to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by construing the
Act to avoid a potential constitutional problem.4 This sort of avoidance boasts a
pedigree dating at least as far back as Justice Brandeis‘s famous concurrence in
the Ashwander case.5 Although the avoidance canon has come under attack in
recent years, Phil‘s work has defended it on Legal Process grounds.6
This Essay largely supports Phil‘s defense of the avoidance canon, but
links that defense to another set of canons that Phil has criticized: the various
clear statement rules of statutory construction that Phil and Bill Eskridge
memorably labeled ―quasi-constitutional law.‖7 These rules require that
Congress make its intent especially clear when it legislates in areas of particular
constitutional sensitivity—for example, by intruding on the prerogatives of the
states.8 Although Professors Frickey and Eskridge were concerned that clear
statement rules represented an illegitimate form of ―stealth‖ constitutionalism,9
I suggest here that they in fact reflect a continuity of statutory and
constitutional interpretation that the Legal Process thinkers noted long ago.
That continuity, in turn, arises from a basic but underappreciated fact about our
Constitution: the canonical document leaves much of the critical ―constitutive‖
work in our polity—that is, the function of setting up our governmental
institutions, defining their composition and procedures, and bestowing (and
limiting) their powers—to be accomplished by statutes, regulations, and other
2. See generally Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court,
93
397 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (―[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.‖); see also Nat‘l Labor Relations
Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 (1979).
4. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
5. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
6. Frickey, supra note 2, at 399–400 (―Brandeis‘s rules of avoidance may not have worn
well over the years . . . . [A] plethora of commentators and judges of different ideological
perspectives have in various ways criticized the canon or related techniques.‖).
7. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
593 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (interpreting an ambiguous federal
statute not to regulate the internal operations of a state government absent a clear statement of
Congress‘s intent to do so).
9. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term, Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108
26, 85 (1994) (―Insistence upon a super-clear statement
from Congress when its statutes venture close to—but not beyond—a constitutional periphery is a
way for the Court to enforce its favored constitutional values, but without risking an open
confrontation with Congress.‖).
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subconstitutional materials.10 Because important structural statutes, like the
Voting Rights Act, perform significant constitutive functions, it makes sense
that they should be interpreted in light of constitutional purposes, including
federalism and other structural values.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I develops two problems in
statutory construction—the canon of constitutional avoidance and judge-made
clear statement rules—by reference to some major cases decided in the
Supreme Court‘s 2008 Term. Part II elaborates the Legal Process School‘s
approach to these sorts of problems of canonical construction, with particular
emphasis on Professor Frickey‘s work in this vein. Part III then develops the
central Legal Process insight that rules of construction are part of constitutional
interpretation as a means of interpreting and protecting the broader structural
aspects of the Constitution, namely, federalism and separation of powers.
I
TWO PROBLEMS IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The 2008 Supreme Court Term was notable largely for its statutory
decisions, which addressed basic matters of election law,11 equal rights,12 and
the preemptive effect of federal law.13 These cases illustrate two issues that
have loomed large in Professor Frickey‘s work: the canon of constitutional
avoidance and the clear statement rules of statutory construction. The
avoidance canon is ―a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise
of this Court‘s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of
the case.‖14 In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder, the Court adopted a vigorously contested reading of the Voting Rights
Act to avoid serious questions about the Act‘s constitutionality. In three
preemption cases, Good, Wyeth, and Clearing House, the Court rejected
challenges to a prominent clear statement rule requiring that Congress clearly
articulate any intent to displace state law. Each of these decisions thus
implicated the legitimacy of canons of construction designed to enforce
constitutional values.

10. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117
408 (2007) (developing the point that statutes, regulations, and other forms of ―ordinary‖ law
perform constitutional functions in our legal system).
11. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009); see also
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1243 (2009) (holding that section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act did not allow plaintiffs to raise ―crossover district‖ claims).
12. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
13. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187
(2009); Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
14. Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam).
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A. Constitutional Avoidance and the Northwest Austin Case
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires state and local governments in
certain parts of the United States to ―preclear‖ all changes in state election
procedure with federal authorities in Washington, D.C.15 Those authorities may
preclear a new procedure only after concluding that the proposed change
neither ―has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color.‖16 The Northwest Austin case involved
a local public utility district that wished to allow district residents to elect its
board members while voting in general county elections rather than at special
polling places. The public utility district, which had never been accused of
racial bias in the conduct of its elections,17 argued that it was entitled under the
terms of the statute to ―bail out‖ of section 5‘s preclearance requirement.18 If
the Act were interpreted to foreclose an entity like the utility district from
bailing out, the district insisted, then section 5 would exceed Congress‘s
authority to enforce the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment.19
The district‘s statutory argument rested on section 4(b) of the Act, which
provides that a ―State or political subdivision‖ may bring suit to bail out of its
obligations under the Act by demonstrating that it has not been guilty of any
unlawful discriminatory practices.20 A three-judge district court rejected this
argument, concluding that section 14(c)(2) of the Act confined the ―political
subdivisions‖ that may seek bailout to a ―county or parish . . . [or] any other
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.‖21 Because the
utility district did not register voters, the district court concluded that it was
ineligible for bailout.22
In the Supreme Court, the utility district argued that section 14(c)(2)‘s
restrictive definition of ―political subdivision‖ applied only to certain portions
of the Act, and that the bailout provisions should be interpreted to embrace a
broader, ordinary meaning of ―political subdivision‖ congruent with the ambit
of the preclearance obligation itself.23 The Court had previously interpreted that

15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
16. Id.
17. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009).
18. Id. at 2510.
19. Id. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits each government in the United States from
denying any citizen the right to vote based on that citizen‘s ―race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.‖
amend. XV, § 1. Section 2 states that ―Congress shall have the power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.‖ Id. § 2.
20. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 279 (D.D.C.
2008), rev’d sub nom Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009); see
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c(a).
21. 573 F. Supp. 2d at 231; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2).
22. 573 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
23. Brief for Appellant at 17–22, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S.
Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322).
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obligation, after all, to cover entities such as cities that did not register voters.24
However, election law experts initially gave this argument relatively little
chance of success; as Heather Gerken wrote, ―the statutory argument is one that
almost no one . . . thought was particularly tenable because of prior Court
opinions.‖25 Nor was it clear that, if interpreted to preclude bailout for entities
like the district, the Act would actually be unconstitutional.26 After all, the
three-judge district court had not only rejected the district‘s bailout argument
but also upheld the Act‘s constitutionality as interpreted.27 Finally, as Justice
Thomas‘s concurrence pointed out, there was some doubt whether the district‘s
statutory argument could—even if successful—support all the relief that the
district had requested.28 Nonetheless, the Court brushed these objections aside,
interpreting the Act to permit ―bailout‖ under the circumstances and resting that
interpretation squarely on the need to avoid any doubt as to the Act‘s
constitutionality.29
Chief Justice Roberts grounded the avoidance doctrine in a restrained
view of the Court‘s role vis-à-vis Congress:
In assessing [serious constitutional] questions, we are keenly mindful
of our institutional role. We fully appreciate that judging the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress is ―the gravest and most
delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.‖ ―The Congress is
a coequal branch of government whose Members take the same oath
we do to uphold the Constitution of the United States.‖ The Fifteenth
Amendment empowers ―Congress,‖ not the Court, to determine in the
first instance what legislation is needed to enforce it.30
24. United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm‘rs, 435 U.S. 110, 121–22 (1978).
25. Posting of Heather K. Gerken to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/
supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html (June 22, 2009, 10:42 AM). Likewise, Richard Hasen
opined shortly after oral argument that ―[s]ince there‘s no good statutory loophole, the larger
constitutional question seems unavoidable.‖ Richard L. Hasen, Sordid Business: Will the Supreme
Court Kill the Voting Rights Act?,
, Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2216888/.
26. The avoidance at issue in Northwest Austin was thus ―modern,‖ as opposed to
―classical‖ avoidance. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85
1945
(1997) (developing this distinction). Under the classical version of the doctrine, a court interprets
the statute using traditional methods of statutory construction and then actually decides whether
that construction would be constitutional. If this best interpretation would require invalidating the
statute, the court then adopts another acceptable construction that avoids that necessity. See id. at
1949. Under the modern version of the doctrine, however, a court displaces the ―best‖
interpretation as long as that interpretation raises serious constitutional ―doubts‖; the court does
not actually resolve those doubts by deciding the constitutional question. See id. In Northwest
Austin, the Court did not actually decide whether section 5 of the Voting Rights Act would be
unconstitutional if construed to foreclose bailout to an entity like the district.
27. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
28. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2517–19 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 2513 (majority opinion).
30. Id. (citations omitted); see Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005) (asserting that
―[t]he [avoidance] canon is thus a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting
it‖).
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As several commentators have noted, however, the avoidance canon is
restrained in the sense that it avoids actually striking down the law in question,
yet it is quite activist in other important senses.31 Frederick Schauer has pointed
out, for example, that a court that bypasses the most plausible interpretation of
a statute to avoid constitutional doubt effectively denies force to the disfavored
interpretation, just as if the court had struck that interpretation down.32
Similarly, Judge Richard Posner has observed that the avoidance canon creates
a ―judge-made constitutional ‗penumbra‘ that has much the same prohibitory
effect as the . . . Constitution itself.‖33 The upshot, as Professor Frickey has
stated, is that ―the avoidance canon, purportedly designed to avoid the fraught
business of judicial review and potential confrontations with a coordinate
branch, actually amounts to a robust version of judicial review without the
safeguards of reasoned elaboration of constitutional law.‖34
As I have discussed at greater length elsewhere, it seems clear that the
avoidance canon must be defended as a normative canon of statutory
construction—that is, as a means of enforcing particular constitutional values,
not as a ―best guess‖ at what Congress would have wanted under the
circumstances.35 When a court avoids a constitutional doubt, it is protecting
constitutional values by resisting statutory interpretations that would put
pressure on those values. As Professor Frickey has pointed out, ―[t]he canon
provides a means to mediate the borderline between statutory interpretation and
constitutional law, and between the judicial and legislative roles, where judicial
line-drawing is especially difficult and where underenforced constitutional
values are at stake.‖36 The Northwest Austin case highlights this function. If
voting experts are right that ―the Court applied the canon to adopt an
implausible reading of a statute that appeared contrary to textual analysis,
congressional intent, and administrative interpretation,‖37 then the avoidance

31. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995
71, 73–74;
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
800, 816 (1983). I use ―activist‖ here to signify simply an assertion of judicial power visà-vis the political branches. See generally Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative
Politics, 73
1139 (2002) (exploring the meaning of judicial ―activism‖).
32. Schauer, supra note 31, at 87.
33. Posner, supra note 31, at 816.
34. Frickey, supra note 2, at 400; see also Schauer, supra note 31, at 90 (making the same
point).
35. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78
1549 (2000). On the distinction between
―normative‖ and ―descriptive‖ canons, see Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl
Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45
561, 563 (1992);
Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and
Its Consequences, 45
743, 749 (1992); see also Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional
Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009
181, 185 (making a
similar distinction between ―substantive‖ and ―language‖ canons).
36. Frickey, supra note 2, at 402.
37. Hasen, supra note 35, at 3 (emphasis added).
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canon plainly played a strong normative role in driving the Court‘s construction
of the Act.
B. “Quasi-Constitutional” Clear Statement Rules and the Preemption Cases
In its 2008 Term, the Supreme Court decided three major cases
concerning the preemptive effect of federal regulatory regimes on state law.
Historically, the centerpiece of the Court‘s preemption jurisprudence has been a
―presumption against preemption‖ in construing federal statutes. In Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,38 the Court stated that, generally speaking, ―the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‖39 This
presumption is the most important, and most frequently invoked, of the profederalism clear statement rules that Professors Frickey and Eskridge examine
in their seminal article on Quasi-Constitutional Law.40 In that article, Frickey
and Eskridge recognize the virtues of clear statement rules as a means of
protecting constitutional values without going so far as to invalidate
legislation.41 Nonetheless, they criticize such rules as undermining judicial
candor by encouraging judges to mask substantive value choices in the rhetoric
of statutory construction, and as reflecting—in particular contexts—particular
value choices that they find normatively suspect.42
Two of the 2008 Term preemption decisions, Altria Group, Inc. v. Good
and Wyeth v. Levine, explicitly rested on the presumption against preemption.43
In Altria, smokers of so-called light cigarettes sued cigarette manufacturers
under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, claiming that the manufacturers
had fraudulently advertised that their cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine

38. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
39. Id. at 230. For a historical account of the development of the Court‘s preemption
jurisprudence, and the Rice presumption‘s place within that development, see Stephen A.
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
767 (1994); see also Ernest A.
Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in
,
249, 250–54 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (stressing
the functional importance of the Rice presumption).
40. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7. Oddly, Professors Frickey and Eskridge did not
include Rice‘s presumption against preemption of state law among the five pro-federalism clear
statement rules discussed in the Vanderbilt article. This may be because that article focused on the
Court‘s ―super-strong clear statement rules‖ in the federalism area, see id. at 619, and the Rice
presumption—despite its structural importance—has never been ―super-strong‖; indeed, it is often
ignored or overcome by relatively weak evidence of Congress‘s intent. Moreover, Frickey and
Eskridge focused on the new federalism rules developed by the late Burger and Rehnquist Courts,
whereas the Rice rule predates those courts by nearly half a century. In any event, Rice operates in
much the same way as the other clear statement rules that Frickey and Eskridge discussed, and it
raises many of the same potential problems.
41. See id. at 630–32.
42. See id. at 632–45.
43. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2009); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187
(2009).

Young.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete)

1378

9/30/2010 5:47 PM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1371

than regular brands.44 The manufacturers argued that both the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act and the Federal Trade Commission‘s
enforcement efforts under the Act preempted these state law claims.45 The
Supreme Court, however, rejected both these preemption arguments.46 The Rice
presumption against preemption figured importantly in the Court‘s analysis of
the federal statute‘s express preemption clause. As Justice Stevens wrote for the
majority, ―when the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than
one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‗accept the reading that disfavors preemption.‘‖47
Wyeth involved a state common law tort suit against a pharmaceutical
manufacturer alleging failure adequately to warn that the administration of an
antinausea drug in a certain fashion could cause gangrene.48 The manufacturer
argued that the Food and Drug Administration‘s approval of the drug and its
warning label preempted the plaintiff‘s state law claim. In rejecting the
manufacturer‘s argument, the Court embraced the Rice presumption against
preemption even more firmly than it had in Altria, calling that presumption a
―cornerstone[] of our pre-emption jurisprudence.‖49 Moreover, the Court
explicitly rejected two attempts by the defendants to undermine that
presumption, holding that the presumption applied notwithstanding
longstanding federal regulatory activity in the relevant field, and that it applied
to ―implied conflict pre-emption‖ claims as well as to express preemption
claims.50 The Court likewise turned aside a frontal assault on Rice by the
manufacturer and its amici arguing that the presumption was inconsistent with
the original understanding of the Supremacy Clause.51
The third case, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, found the plain meaning
of the statute in question sufficient to reject the preemption argument, but
nonetheless stressed the magnitude of the intrusion on state law that would
result from a preemption finding.52 Clearing House was a suit by the federal
44. Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 541.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 549, 551.
47. Id. at 543 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)).
48. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191–92.
49. Id. at 1194.
50. Id. at 1195 n.3.
51. See Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) (―The time has come for
this Court to clarify once and for all that . . . the presumption against preemption simply does not
apply to the analysis of whether state law conflicts with federal law.‖). For an effort to refute that
argument, see Brief for Constitutional and Administrative Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 4–18, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249). I was
the primary author of the latter brief, along with Erin Glenn Busby and Melissa Davis, and we
were honored that Phil Frickey was a signatory.
52. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2720–22 (2009). For an extended
discussion of the banking law issues in Clearing House and the case‘s place in the Roberts Court‘s
evolving preemption jurisprudence, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The
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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and a banking trade group to
enjoin New York‘s Attorney General from requesting certain nonpublic
information from national banks doing business in the state. Rejecting the claim
that the state‘s action was preempted, Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion brushed
aside the federal agency‘s claim for Chevron deference53 and construed the
National Bank Act‘s grant of exclusive ―visitorial powers‖ to the OCC as
coexisting with the state‘s power to enforce its fair lending laws.54 The Court
emphasized that ―[t]he consequences of the [OCC‘s] regulation‖—its effort to
foreclose state officials from enforcing their own valid banking laws—―cast
doubt upon its validity.‖55 Although the Court disclaimed the need to rely on
Rice, its analysis came close to recognizing that such an intrusion on state
regulatory authority is presumptively not Congress‘s intent. In all three of the
2008 Term preemption cases, then, the Court sought some heightened showing
of congressional intent before interpreting federal statutes to intrude on state
prerogatives.
As I have already noted, Professors Frickey and Eskridge have been
skeptical of clear statement rules like the presumption against preemption.
They summarized their argument:
[I]n the abstract there are powerful arguments for quasi-constitutional
law rooted in a vision of our public lawmaking processes as a
partnership in which the judiciary plays an active role, but eventually
defers to the democratically accountable branches. In some contexts,
these arguments may have substantial persuasive power. We fear,
however, that they have had little contextual bite in many of the recent
cases . . . . We also fear that a lack of recognition and candor about
what the Court has done recently with quasi-constitutional law has
submerged a variety of hotly contestable normative and empirical
issues.56
At least as traditionally formulated, the Rice presumption seems vulnerable to
some of these criticisms. Just as the Northwest Austin Court justified the
avoidance canon in terms of deference to Congress,57 the Court has always
Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, in
(Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds.,
forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499216.
53. Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
the courts defer to a federal administrative agency‘s interpretation of a statute that it administers if
the statute is ambiguous and the agency‘s interpretation is reasonable. On the complicated
interaction of Chevron with the Rice presumption in preemption cases, see Ernest A. Young,
Executive Preemption, 102
869 (2008).
54. Clearing House, 129 S. Ct. at 2715; see Wilmarth, supra note 52 (manuscript at 44–48)
(suggesting structural similarities between Justice Scalia‘s refusal to defer to the OCC under
Chevron in Cuomo and analysis under a presumption against preemption).
55. Clearing House, 129 S. Ct. at 2717.
56. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at 646.
57. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

Young.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete)

1380

9/30/2010 5:47 PM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1371

phrased the presumption against preemption in terms of what Congress most
likely wanted.58 Yet it is far from clear that Congress in fact harbors any
general solicitude for state regulatory authority that would justify the Rice
presumption as a descriptive canon of statutory construction. The presumption
is better justified as a normative canon designed to protect state autonomy in
our federal system.
If Rice cannot be justified as a best guess at Congress‘s likely intent, then
the criticism advanced by Professors Frickey and Eskridge—that clear
statement issues undermine candor and submerge contestable normative
issues—have some force. I believe that criticism can be met, however, and that
it is best met from within the Legal Process paradigm that Frickey and Eskridge
have done so much to advance. That paradigm, I argue, offers a persuasive
justification for both clear statement rules like the Rice presumption and the
canon of constitutional avoidance. I develop this argument in the next Part.
II
LEGAL PROCESS THEORY AND THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE
CONSTITUTION
Recasting the avoidance canon and the Rice presumption against
preemption as normative canons of statutory construction hardly ends the
debate over their legitimacy. Normative canons are, after all, highly
controversial.59 Justice Scalia, for example, has questioned ―where the courts
get the authority to impose‖ such rules.60 Judges employing such canons cannot
cast themselves as ―faithful agents‖ of Congress; rather, they must find some
other source of legal justification for the normative values that the canons
protect. I suggest that that source is the Constitution itself—the constitutional
values implicated by the underlying ―doubt‖ in the case of the avoidance canon,
and the particular value of federalism in the case of the presumption against
preemption.61 Further, I claim that this argument is best defended in terms of
58. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (describing the
presumption as an ―assumption‖ about when Congress means to supersede state police powers).
After all, the Court generally invokes the Rice presumption in tandem with a statement that ―‗[t]he
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone‘ in every pre-emption case.‖ Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) (also quoting
Medtronic).
59. See
,
945 (4th ed.
2007).
60
,
29 (1997); see also Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 744 (observing that the ―substantive form of
canonical construction raises a . . . central concern . . . that judicial policymaking through the
guise of statutory interpretation is illegitimate.‖).
61. I have elaborated these views at greater length elsewhere. On the avoidance canon, see
Young, supra note 35, at 1585–99. On the presumption against preemption, see Ernest A. Young,
Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments,
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Legal Process ideas concerning the continuity of constitutional and statutory
interpretation.
A. The Legal Process School
Neil Duxbury has characterized the Legal Process jurisprudence as
―premissed [sic] on nothing more specific or substantial than an attitude‖ rather
than a coherent theory; this, he suggests, makes the precise nature of process
jurisprudence ―remarkably difficult to pin down.‖62 He notes, moreover, that
―[t]hose who adopted the process attitude were concerned not so much with
developing a distinct theory as with cultivating their attitude in order to cast
light on what they considered to be the principal problems in the creation and
application of law.‖63 This is, to some extent at least, a fair description not only
of Henry Hart and Al Sacks‘s project in The Legal Process itself but also of the
work of Phil Frickey, Bill Eskridge, and others reviving and developing Legal
Process principles in the specific context of statutory construction. In each
instance, any effort to crystallize the content of Legal Process jurisprudence
takes a backseat to handling particular doctrinal problems.
Certain key principles do emerge, nonetheless.64 One is the principle of
―institutional settlement,‖ which holds that law should allocate decision making
to the institutions best suited to decide particular questions, and that the
decisions reached by those institutions must then be respected by other actors in
the system, even if those actors might have reached a different conclusion had
they decided the matter in the first instance.65 Richard Fallon identifies a
second and related ―anti-positivist principle,‖ which sees the law allocating
responsibility among institutions ―as a rich, fluid, and evolving set of norms for
effective governance and dispute resolution, not as a positivist system of fixed
and determinate rules.‖66 This view implies that ―[a]ny particular legal directive
must be seen and interpreted in light of the whole body of law‖ and that ―legal
46
1733, 1848–50 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Making Federalism
Doctrine]; Young, supra note 39, at 250–54.
62.
,
207 (1995).
63. Id.
64. I am indebted here to Richard Fallon‘s helpful summary of six characteristic Legal
Process assumptions, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm,
47
953, 963–66 (1994), as well as to Professors Eskridge and Frickey‘s extended
introduction to the Legal Process materials themselves, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to
,
(William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
65. See
, supra note 64, at 4 (―[D]ecisions which are the duly arrived at
result of duly established procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society
unless and until they are duly changed.‖); id. at 158 (stressing the importance of comparative
institutional competence in allocating authority to decide); see also Fallon, supra note 64, at 964;
Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 1, at 1158–63 (discussing this principle in the context
of foreign affairs law).
66. Fallon, supra note 64, at 965.
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interpretation should be purposive, not rigid or mechanical.‖67 Relatedly, in
construing the allocation of decision-making authority, ―the principles and
policies underlying federalism and the separation of powers deserve special
weight.‖68 More generally, institutional settlement puts process firmly at the
center of legal thinking.69
Although Legal Process thinkers emphasized the importance of
nonjudicial actors such as administrative agencies, they envisioned a special
role for courts. They believed, for example, that ―[t]he rule of law . . . requires
the availability of judicial remedies sufficient to vindicate fundamental legal
principles.‖70 The fundamental constraint is that ―courts must be principled in
their reasoning.‖71 That is, courts must decide cases based on general, neutral
reasons that transcend the immediate controversy before them.72
But subject to that constraint, process jurisprudence embraced a principle
of ―reasoned elaboration‖ according broad creative powers to courts.73 For Hart
and Sacks, for example, ―[l]aw is a doing of something, a purposive activity, a
continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living.‖74 Hence,
judges should apply statutes and common law doctrines ―in ways that subserve
their purposes, as well as the general purposes of the law.‖75
Although this Legal Process worldview is often portrayed as a response to
the Legal Realists,76 it may be more accurate to say that process jurisprudence
emerged as a parallel critique of Formalism that differed from Realism by
insisting on the continuing value of rationalism in law.77 Critically, Legal
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. (identifying a ―principle of structural interpretation‖).
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 64, at xciv–xcv.
Fallon, supra note 64, at 966.
Id.
See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
1, 15 (1959).
73. Fallon, supra note 64, at 966 (noting that the judicial role ―is limited to the reasoned
elaboration of principles and policies that are ultimately traceable to more democratically
legitimate decisionmakers‖); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, reprinted in
,
136 (1978).
74
, supra note 64, at 148.
75. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 64, at xcii.
76. G. Edward White has argued, for example, that ―Reasoned Elaboration emerged in the
late 1930‘s and the early 1940‘s when certain social experiences . . . generated overwhelming
academic hostility to jurisprudential Realism.‖ White, supra note 73, at 136–37. Neil Duxbury
brands this account ―another common misconception about American jurisprudence.‖
,
supra note 62, at 205. This is because ―[h]istorically, the process-oriented approach to the study of
law parallels if not precedes legal realism itself.‖ Id. But if we put historical chronology to one
side, it may nonetheless be helpful to say that process jurisprudence offers a conceptual response
to realist skepticism about the determinacy of law that does not require a retreat to formalism. As
Professor Duxbury acknowledges, this response gained widespread currency ―once the mood of
realism began to wane.‖ Id.
77. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 64, at lxii–lxiii:
Although the legal realists generally did not, some of the centrist critics of formalism
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Process thought insisted that law and the judicial function differ significantly
from raw politics and policy.78 Thus, while acknowledging the Realist point
that ―general directives often do not transparently tell officials and citizens
what to do in specific situations,‖ Legal Process proponents of ―reasoned
elaboration‖ rejected Realist claims that ―the official simply imposes a political
interpretation on the general directive and that law is a prediction of how the
official will exercise his discretion.‖79 Instead, the Legal Process School
insisted that ―an official applying a ‗general directive arrangement‘ must
‗elaborate the arrangement in a way which is consistent with the other
established applications of it‘ and ‗must do so in a way which best serves the
principles and policies it expresses.‘‖80
In their Harvard Law Review Foreword, Professors Frickey and Eskridge
echo this view of Legal Process jurisprudence as an intermediate position
between the Legal Realist and formalist views:
Courts are special because they are neutral bodies that adjudicate
disputes. When the Court makes decisions about public law, it should
be careful neither to sacrifice its adjudicative integrity, nor to
undermine its legitimacy in American government. Within these
confines, the Court should contribute to lawmaking by using its
comparatively greater ability to engage in the reasoned elaboration of
principle.81
Courts, in other words, must maintain a distinction between law and politics,
while recognizing that sensitivity to the underlying normative imperatives of
American society remains part of their job description. They do this by
elaborating legal texts and doctrines in light of the overall structure of
American law and the broad general principles held by the American political
community. As I hope to show in the next Section, this means—in part—
interpreting statutes in light of constitutional principles.

valued rationality in law. But the centrists‘ version of rationalism was different from
that of the formalists: the formalists believed in a static rationality . . . while the new
rationalists believed that law‘s rationality is informed by an organic relationship among
legal rules, social policies, and ethical principles.
See also
, supra note 62, at 205 (―[P]rocess jurisprudence exemplifies the emergence of
reason as the dominant ideological and theoretical motif in American legal thought.‖).
78. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59
376, 378
(1946) (stating that a reasoned decision does not reflect the judge‘s ―personal predilections‖ but
attempts ―to discover the natural principles underlying group life, so that [the judge‘s] decisions
might conform to them‖).
79. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 64, at xcii.
80. Id. (quoting
, supra note 64, at 147).
81. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 34; see also
, supra note 62, at 205
(―Process jurisprudence . . . marks the beginning of American lawyers attempting to explain legal
decision-making not in terms of deductive logic or the intuitions of officials, but in terms of
reason which is embodied in the fabric of the law itself.‖). For a similar view, not explicitly
framed in Legal Process terms, see Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86
959 (2008).
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B. Reasoned Elaboration and the Constitution Outside the Constitution
Debates about canons of construction—including the avoidance canon
and, more recently, clear statement rules—have long been a staple of the
academic literature on legislation. In this Section, I argue that we can advance
those debates by looking back to the Legal Process concept of ―reasoned
elaboration.‖ Viewed from this perspective, statutory interpretation always
takes place against a background of underlying purposes and values, including
constitutional values. That basic continuity of statutory and constitutional
interpretation, in turn, allows us to think of the avoidance canon and the clear
statement rules not so much as substitutes for constitutional adjudication, but
rather as a means by which constitutional principles are sometimes vindicated.
Justice Frankfurter, a patron saint for Legal Process thinkers of the next
generation, considered the avoidance canon to be a ―rule of constitutional
adjudication‖ rather than a rule of statutory construction.82 Likewise, Henry
Hart and Al Sacks considered ―policies of clear statement‖ to be
―constitutionally imposed.‖83 This stance toward these two normative canons of
interpretation flowed from the conception of reasoned elaboration and
purposive interpretation at the heart of process jurisprudence:
Not only does every particular legal arrangement have its own
particular purpose but that purpose is always a subordinate one in aid
of the more general and thus more nearly ultimate purposes of the law.
Doubts about the purposes of particular statutes or decisional
doctrines, it would seem to follow, must be resolved, if possible, so as
to harmonize them with more general principles and policies. The
organizing and rationalizing power of this idea is inestimable.84
This conception of statutory purpose—that is, as not limited to the legislature‘s
specific purposes, but also incorporating the more fundamental purposes of
public law—effectively renders statutory and constitutional law continuous.85
Courts (and possibly other interpreters) integrate statutes into the constitutional
framework by interpreting statutes in line with constitutional principle.
This same sense of continuity appears, although implicitly, in the structure
of that other canonical Legal Process text, Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler‘s
monumental The Federal Courts and the Federal System.86 Hart and Wechsler

82. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 477 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
83.
, supra note 64, at 1376.
84. Id. at 148.
85. Cf. Frickey, supra note 2, at 407 (―Hart and Sacks saw their background assumptions
concerning the purposivism of legislatures and legislation as constitutionally informed.‖).
86.
,
(1953). That text, unlike Hart and Sacks‘s Legal Process, was published early
on and continues to be updated. The current version is
,
(6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter
].
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developed the structure of American federalism and separation of powers by
placing constitutional features (e.g., Article III‘s provision for federal
jurisdiction and limitation of judicial power to cases and controversies87)
alongside statutory ones (e.g., the Supreme Court‘s jurisdictional statute or the
Rules of Decision Act88) and judge-made doctrines (e.g., prudential standing
rules or the abstention doctrines89). In other words, Hart and Wechsler
emphasized the ―organic‖ interconnection of constitutionally entrenched and
non-entrenched features in constituting our judicial system. Moreover, they
offered an influential vision of federalism resting not on constitutional borders
between enumerated federal functions and reserved state powers,90 but rather
on Congress‘s activity in enacting federal law and the institutional impediments
that hold that activity in check.91
This Legal Process view of statutory and constitutional law as
fundamentally integrated reflects a foundational reality of our constitutional
system. If one considers the basic functions of a constitution—for example,
constituting the government and conferring rights on individuals against
government action92—one quickly recognizes that the Constitution itself is
radically incomplete. For example, our canonical constitutional document says
nothing about such basic governmental structures as political parties, the voting
rules for ordinary legislation in Congress, or federal administrative agencies.93
Likewise, the Constitution‘s rights provisions omit such basic and valued rights
as protection from private discrimination, access to medical care and income
security in old age, or preservation of a clean environment.94 These basic
features of our legal system, all of which perform ―constitutional‖ functions,
are codified in statutes or in even more ephemeral form, such as in the internal
operating rules of the House and the Senate.

87.
art. III, § 2; see
, supra note 86, at 113–27 (discussing
standing as a constitutional doctrine rooted in Article III).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (prescribing the Supreme Court‘s jurisdiction over appeals
from state courts); id. § 1652 (state laws as rules of decision); see
, supra note
86, at 448–58 (describing how statutory limits on Supreme Court review of state courts guarantee
state courts‘ control over the content of state law); id. at 558–64 (describing the role of the Rules
of Decision Act and the Erie doctrine in structuring American federalism).
89. See
, supra note 86, at 128 (discussing prudential standing rules);
id. at 1049–1140 (discussing Pullman, Younger, Colorado River, and other judge-made abstention
doctrines).
90. See, e.g.,
amend. X; Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism,
36
1 (1950).
91.
, supra note 86, at 459 (discussing ―the interstitial nature of federal
law‖). For an important recent effort to flesh out this vision, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
1321 (2001).
92. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in
64, 65 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
93. See Young, supra note 10, at 415–22.
94. See id. at 422–26.
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Elsewhere, I have described these statutes, regulations, rules, and
practices that perform constitutive functions as part of a ―constitution outside
the Constitution.‖95 They differ from the canonical document, of course, in the
sense that they are not entrenched against change by ordinary legislation. It is
easy to overstate the importance of that distinction, however. The canonical
Constitution frequently changes through interpretation without formal
amendment,96 and many lesser enactments that create governmental structures
or confer rights on individuals are, as a practical matter, quite difficult to
overturn. Consider, for example, the Social Security Act, which is less likely to
be repealed than many constitutional provisions. In any event, my point is not
to suggest that statutes, regulations, and the like that perform constitutive
functions should be accorded any special status in the law; rather, I mean
simply to point out the undeniable reality that statutes and other forms of
―ordinary‖ law frequently perform the same functions as constitutional law.97
The role of this extra-canonical constitution is pervasive in our
constitutional system. It accounts for the ability of our constitutional system to
survive over two centuries of fairly radical political, social, and economic
change even though formal amendment is nearly impossible. The Constitution
adapts effectively because relatively little institutional detail is committed to
entrenched provisions that cannot be readily changed.98 And although the Legal
Process thinkers did not speak of a ―constitution outside the Constitution‖ in so
many words, that notion meshes well with their view that ―the ‗law‘ bearing on
allocations of institutional responsibility [is] a rich, fluid, and evolving set of
norms for effective governance and dispute resolution.‖99 As I explain in the
last Part, it also makes sense of their commitment to the avoidance doctrine and
policies of clear statement as an integral part of constitutional interpretation.
III
THE CONTINUITY OF INTERPRETATION
Professor Frickey has said that the canon of constitutional avoidance ―has
the hybrid quality of quasi-constitutional law. It is a tool of public law on the
borderline between constitutional law and subconstitutional law, and between
judicial and legislative functions.‖100 Frickey approved of this hybrid quality of

95. See Young, supra note 10. For a similar argument, much earlier, see Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34
1 (1934).
96. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling recent precedent to hold
that the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (adopting a considerably broader view of Congress‘s Commerce Power than that taken by
prior courts).
97. See Young, supra note 10, at 448–61. On the constitutive role of statutes, see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50
1215 (2001).
98. See Young, supra note 10, at 456–57.
99. Fallon, supra note 64, at 965.
100. Frickey, supra note 2, at 461.
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the avoidance canon, suggesting that it ―provides a means to mediate the
borderline between statutory interpretation and constitutional law . . . between
the judicial and legislative roles . . . [and] between constitutional law and
constitutional culture.‖101 Professors Frickey and Eskridge were more critical of
―quasi-constitutional‖ clear statement rules, however. They insist in their
Harvard Foreword that ―in statutory interpretation cases with constitutional
issues in the background, the Court‘s capricious invention and invocation of
super-strong clear statement rules avoids immediate constitutional conflict at
the price of candid ventilation of constitutional concerns and sacrifices the
reliability of the canonical interpretive regime constructed by the Court.‖102
I argue that Professor Frickey was right about the avoidance canon but
unduly sour on clear statement rules. Both principles reflect the Legal Process
notion that statutory and constitutional interpretation are continuous, and they
acknowledge the constitutive role that statutes and other extra-canonical legal
materials play in forming our ―constitution outside the Constitution.‖ Both the
avoidance canon and clear statement rules, like the presumption against
preemption, counsel courts to interpret statutes in light of constitutional values.
In so doing, they integrate statutes into the broader constitutional structure and
vindicate broader public values immanent in constitutional law. Chief Justice
Roberts‘s interpretation of the Voting Rights Act in Northwest Austin, for
example, may not have represented the ―best‖ reading of the statutory text
considered in isolation, but it did serve to integrate section 5‘s provisions into a
broader federalist scheme designed to balance national power and state
autonomy.
The chief difference, of course, between the avoidance canon and clear
statement rules is that the former comes into play where a legitimate doubt
exists as to the constitutionality of a broad reading of the statute in question,
whereas the latter tend to vindicate constitutional values even where no such
doubt exists—that is, where there is no question that a broad reading of the
relevant statute would be upheld against constitutional challenge. This
difference accounts for Justice Thomas‘s dissent in Gonzales v. Oregon,103
where the Court held that the Attorney General‘s regulation barring the use of
lethal drugs for physician-assisted suicide, made legal under an Oregon state
law, was inconsistent with the underlying federal Controlled Substances Act
(CSA). The majority interpreted the federal statute narrowly in light of the
traditional primacy of the states in regulating the medical profession. Justice
Thomas, however, dissented:
I agree with limiting the applications of the CSA in a manner
consistent with the principles of federalism and our constitutional
structure . . . . But that is now water over the dam. The relevance of
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 402.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 76.
546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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such considerations was at its zenith in Raich, when we considered
whether the CSA could be applied to the intrastate possession of a
controlled substance [medical marijuana] consistent with the limited
federal powers enumerated by the Constitution. Such considerations
have little, if any, relevance where, as here, we are merely presented
with a question of statutory interpretation, and not the extent of
constitutionally permissible federal power.104
Justice Thomas‘s view—at least in this opinion—seems to be that
constitutional values belong only in constitutional cases; they have no role in
shaping the interpretation of statutes when no doubt of the statutes‘
constitutionality exists.
This view, it seems to me, misses an important, if underappreciated,
aspect of the avoidance canon. As Professor Frickey noted, ―serious
constitutional doubts sometimes extend to governmental actions that the courts
are unlikely to invalidate as a matter of constitutional law, but that courts may
nonetheless address by provisional institutional checking.‖105 Frickey argued
that the avoidance canon is ―particularly appropriate‖ in two related contexts:
first, ―cases, generally raising structural constitutional issues, in which linedrawing by the Court is especially difficult,‖ and second, ―circumstances in
which courts, facing institutional impediments to the exercise of traditional
judicial review, use the canon to protect what amount to ‗underenforced‘
constitutional norms.‖106 These two contexts are connected, of course, in that
underenforcement frequently stems from the problems that courts encounter
drawing constitutional lines.
Gonzales v. Oregon fits comfortably within both categories. The
underlying constitutional concern involved the limits of the Commerce Power,
an area of notorious line-drawing difficulty.107 And there is little doubt that—
owing to such difficulties—the constitutional principle of limited and
enumerated powers is ―underenforced.‖108 Yet there was no constitutional
―doubt‖ in the picture; if Congress had, in fact, authorized the Attorney General
to make a rule barring the use of controlled drugs for physician-assisted
suicide, the Court would surely have upheld that rule under Raich. Although
the Oregon case involved no clear statement rules, the federalism concerns
driving interpretation were more akin to such rules than to the avoidance canon.
104. Id. at 301–02 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 74
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
105. Frickey, supra note 2, at 459.
106. Id. at 455; see also Young, supra note 35, at 1603–05 (making a similar argument).
107. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995
125, 205 (discussing the Court‘s difficulties in drawing lines to limit Congress‘s
powers over interstate commerce and the effect of those difficulties on the Court‘s legitimacy).
108. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
1231, 1236–37 (1994). On underenforced constitutional norms generally, see Lawrence
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
1212 (1978).
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The absence of a constitutional doubt declines in importance once we
recognize that the statutes involved in cases like Gonzales v. Oregon also play
constitutive roles in our federal system. In the absence of a Commerce Clause
with bite—as it was interpreted, say, prior to 1937—the line between national
and state authority will typically turn not on Article I of the Constitution but
rather on the terms of the statutes that Congress enacts. A law like the
Controlled Substances Act, for example, allocates some functions to national
authorities while reserving others to the states.109 Once we understand that the
texts of Article I and the Tenth Amendment do not exhaust the structural
provisions of our federal constitution, it makes sense to say—contra Justice
Thomas—that constitutional values are just as relevant when interpreting the
CSA‘s constitutive scope as they are in interpreting the Commerce Clause
itself.110
The preemption cases in the Court‘s 2008 Term illustrate the same
dynamic. These cases are particularly useful examples, precisely because there
is no underlying constitutional ―problem‖ to be avoided by construing the
federal statute narrowly. The Rice presumption is thus the only available means
of giving independent or general weight to constitutional values of state
autonomy, as its application serves to integrate federal statutes into a broader
federalist structure that is respectful of those values. The substantive issues at
stake in preemption cases, moreover, tend to be of broader importance than
those at stake in constitutional litigation under the Commerce Clause itself.111
Justice Stevens has thus consistently insisted that preemption cases are ―case[s]
about federalism‖112—not simply exercises in statutory construction.
The majority opinions in Altria Group, Wyeth, and Clearing House reflect
this effort to integrate the statutory apparatus of the regulatory state into the
more traditional federal structure reflected in the canonical Constitution. All
three opinions grappled with the central puzzle of contemporary preemption
doctrine—that is, how to assimilate potentially preemptive action by federal
administrative agencies into a doctrinal structure that relies heavily on the builtin political and institutional checks on Congress‘s action.113 In each case, the
Court‘s insistence on evidence of Congress‘s intent to preempt state law—in
the face of arguments that agency action preempted state regulation—preserved
important values of state autonomy while reserving to Congress the option of

109. See Young, supra note 10, at 429–33.
110. Id. at 467–68.
111. See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46
1349,
1384–86 (2001).
112. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 887 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991)).
113. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down:
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57
2111 (2008); Young, supra note 39.
On the importance of the political and inertial checks on Congress‘s action, see generally Clark,
supra note 91, at 1339–42.
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expanding the scope of federal preemption should it feel the need to do so.114
As in Gonzales v. Oregon, however, Justice Thomas‘s stance may be the
most interesting. His position on the presumption against preemption, as
reflected in recent cases, has been complex. On the one hand, Thomas has
rejected the use of the Rice presumption in express preemption cases, where
federal legislation explicitly preempts some state norms and the Court‘s task is
to construe the extent of Congress‘s intent to displace state law. In his dissent in
Good, for example, Thomas described the application of Rice in such cases as
―nothing more than a ‗remnant of abandoned doctrine.‘‖115 Under his reading
of the cases, ―the Court is no longer willing to unreasonably interpret expressly
pre-emptive federal laws in the name of congressional purpose . . . or because
Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States . . . . The
text of the statute must control.‖116 And Thomas purported to reserve the
question of Rice‘s application in Wyeth—an implied preemption case.117
On the other hand, Justice Thomas‘s concurrence in Wyeth questioned the
very notion of ―implied conflict preemption‖—an argument that has figured
prominently in a number of important recent decisions.118 He wrote:
I cannot join the majority‘s implicit endorsement of far-reaching
implied pre-emption doctrines. In particular, I have become
increasingly skeptical of this Court‘s ―purposes and objectives‖ preemption jurisprudence. Under this approach, the Court routinely
invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal
policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal
114. The possibility that Congress may revisit the issue and make clear its intent to preempt
state law does not, of course, mean that such revision is easy. Legislative inertia is a powerful
force, although such legislative overrides do occur. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
331 (1991). But to say that
overriding a court‘s application of a clear statement rule may be difficult is simply to say that such
rules may, in fact, function as meaningful constraints on legislative action. That, I have argued
elsewhere, is a very good thing—especially given the weakness of traditional constitutional
constraints in the federalism area. See Young, supra note 39, at 250–54. My central point here is
that clear statement-type constraints derive their normative justification from the same
constitutional principles that undergird more traditional doctrines of constitutional federalism. See
also Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 61, at 1756 (offering a related defense of
clear statement rules).
115. 129 S. Ct. 538, 558 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992)).
116. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
117. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1208 n.2 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(―Because it is evident from the text of the relevant federal statutes and regulations themselves
that the state-law judgment below is not pre-empted, it is not necessary to decide whether, or to
what extent, the presumption should apply in a case such as this one, where Congress has not
enacted an express-pre-emption clause.‖).
118. Id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S.
431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that he is
―increasing[ly] reluctan[t] to expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of
implied pre-emption‖).
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law. Because implied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the
statutory text are inconsistent with the Constitution, I concur only in
the judgment.119
Three things are worth noting in Thomas‘s concurrence. First, a rollback of
preemption doctrine to ―express preemption or nothing‖ would mark a
significant gain for principles of state autonomy. Second, even though Thomas
has questioned the Rice presumption against preemption, his insistence on
express action by Congress before finding preemption is, effectively speaking,
the same thing as a clear statement requirement. Finally, the Wyeth concurrence
marks the most extended effort thus far to ground a view of preemption
doctrine in explicitly constitutional principles of federalism, rather than in some
imputed view of Congress‘s intent.
Justice Thomas‘s stance in Wyeth thus reflects, at a profound level, the
continuity of statutory and constitutional interpretation that informed the Legal
Process School. Although one might quarrel with particular wrinkles of
Thomas‘s approach to preemption, his suggestion that Congress must explicitly
act to preempt state law unquestionably performs Professor Frickey‘s function
of mediating the boundary between statutory and constitutional law. That same
function is evident, although somewhat less explicit, in the majority opinions in
both of the Court‘s 2008 Term preemption cases and the Northwest Austin
decision. That fact suggests that, while the Legal Process School has been
pronounced dead more than once, it remains alive and well in contemporary
debates on the most important questions of statutory construction. We have Phil
Frickey‘s work, in large part, to thank for that.
CONCLUSION
The standard history of American jurisprudence portrays various schools
of thought coming and going in succession: the Legal Realists exploded the
pretensions of mechanical jurisprudence; the Legal Process School responded
to Legal Realism, and then gave way to Law and Economics, Critical Legal
Studies, etc. The truth is, however, that each of these perspectives lingers long
after other movements come on the scene. One need not deny the contributions
of subsequent modes of legal thought to say that the Legal Process perspective
remains viable and valuable today. From statutory construction120 to federal
jurisdiction121 to international law,122 Legal Process thought enlightens and
informs current debates. That this is so owes much to the work of Phil Frickey.
119. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas‘s stance likely
drew upon an important article by his former law clerk, Caleb Nelson, who likewise questioned
broad notions of implied preemption while at the same time arguing that the Rice presumption is
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption,
86
225 (2000).
120. See
, supra note 59, at 712–64.
121. See
, supra note 86, at 72–80.
122. See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 1, at 1151–63.
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I have focused in this Essay on Phil‘s work concerning the canon of
constitutional avoidance and the various clear statement rules that protect
constitutional values in statutory interpretation. Both principles, as Phil
recognized, mediate the boundary between constitutional and statutory law.
And I have suggested that this mediating function is particularly important in a
constitutional system that leaves much of its institutional structure to be
―constituted‖ by ordinary legislation. In such a system, it makes sense for
constitutional and statutory interpretation to be continuous.
The Legal Process School famously offered an idealized image of the
legislature as composed of reasonable people pursuing reasonable ends in a
reasonable manner.123 In closing this Essay, I want to suggest that whatever we
actually think of legislators in this more skeptical time, that description
amounts to a pretty good picture of our friend Phil Frickey. In a crowded
intellectual field that puts a premium on novelty and counter-intuitiveness,
Phil‘s career reminds us that reasonableness can be brilliantly and elegantly
done.124

123. See
, supra note 64, at 1378 (suggesting that a court interpreting a
statute ―should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up
of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably‖).
124. In this company, I use ―brilliantly‖ advisedly. See Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against
Brilliance, 70
917 (1986).

